




THE BRAZILIAN POLICY DECISION ACKNOWLEDGING
A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AGAINST THE AXIS -
AUGUST 1942: ITS IMPACT UPON POLITICAL REFORM,
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- i ! ligation hi < »»il
prior to 1930, it v/or centered in %] it in the
init.v of 3ao Paul©* Thlr virtu: lly ensured uneven
econoriic V -• H Duopoly :Htic-l
or for the r i nt. ti 9f feturt an .
5, upon st «r in 1930, i the
the centr " : -.•culd, in re': lit, t
nrcice itl authority over the edespotic -lone tc ruch
an extent rofionallsn; would no 1 divisive
factor in firezilion politic:! life* :>,
onticn ¥1 being focured on. | ' fifWl
function of a political c d, th t




•vemaent throughout the count r . Thi first
order , ' • r- • realised, prior to Initiating
D of economic t«
a cur- or;,- examination of econa k development
thi ut the world , It rent th t the method
•iced upon in particular country is I reflection,
not only of the internal conditions raid external
Influences?, hut the timing involved 1- log the
decision, which aatur direct relationship
to toal 1 reform political devel at,
"
';ls poper will endeavour to analyse the Brazilian
policy decirion to opt for W r l nd It* subsequent impact
upon 1 reform, industrialization and political
velopment with the intent of dcrivln" general
developmental model relevant to count rise currently In
the elopment at Brazil in 1042. Cbvlouely,
it ie ii Ible to examine th ion in deptfe within
the confines of thie paper. However, I cent- id or
th<~ : etoro Influencing th ion, the actOJ
involved, the event e eurroundir. I decision It
I
effect in t -is preview rived, by Gabriel
Almond .a, Ib-rt Hirehmen a . '".
divert.
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Tfi IUAS X 'IC-.L
• 3lli.cn politic* 1 I MS, in :f
inter- 't, continuation of % initiated
ult -evolution ar;:. inrt the
duly constituted c 1 government in October, 1930.
not reeornizinn the re of the election in
30, had with th- U :t of po- 1 int ; in
.in- ulo, replace?' itutlon
n with the fir? t dictator-if I in V
l evolution of Brazil*
', itution of 1891 hr.c be
nded ' . ar of 193©i V gp#4 in
ttf ~ bodltd a constitution th- lli
for the Eat ft (S "0 (n« te) ttm\ ted, in 1937*
From 1^30 > until th " nt c, ro,
including the f 193^, with the pror.ulr' tion ef i n.ew
constitution and Iti lltj 1 1
' n, the Van ' r*\3X- " ce
(utliutlonal ' t% .
In ln37, with the pi lal tartt cf '. eeer-
in ' 1nation
,
the coneervati " la
forced b ftfdown by cheer i< oae hirn in
J 'OC
'
the fortho ' ctior.r . lap the
list threat | a • , Life
th ,t of the .,11' ers
,
Ver flft on a
coup d'etat to - .Ion I if of
lag troops to surround little
tan(Mi with thfl ort of I root,
>roolaim«d himself at, ~l reived Song
end prorulratcd the c novo, thus totting the
ge for the entrance into ./crl' Two.
o fiovo, despite • constitution (fascist
sounding), suspended the political proootfl by oirselvir.-
thi larislr-ture, prohibited electic
erronusout under . ntwasto
s- 11 inter ont
and the people with 8 ttl#
3
only restrict freedo. . Coupled with the s.bcve, wot the
riycrous restriction of the pr . ' e the political
retrogress inn, tl 3ttp r< :d the loyal support of
the workers, unions and elites 'with the inarticulste
A
naeees regaining indifferent.
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Lei .az.il iced countries of
South ic. . Included in the social legiel&tiGB
a c. " I ': ffiing in
th -ert cl':* I -2 1 .ribuncls to regulate
labor ' uter. In rt , the right to etrike wee
. ei • in
n: eric- , (Princeton, :'.. .: D. \ n rnd






October 12, 19*0, p. 3






-action in the power of
labor, t 3 little government lnterf ! in
bus In ^r ofits which obliged enployers to accept the
ion.
Lent o office, Occasionally
the intc of the court:: and improved
government ' : at ion.
r-— t , there ' : congress or elections,
io life of the count ry i Inated ^.he
,
labor unions were not, independent entities
la to th< berahlp and the radio* press end
tools under the di? (Th 1 of ?r nd
?ro- tda) ,9
It is probably cafe to epeouiate that tl:
ere concerned with reform and not liberty, the
Sir©reed, for ell practical purposes*
The population wanted lo:: coct housing, better w
security rather than votes, not realizing that If they




October 1°4C, p. 5.
8. Ibid
. , p. 5.
9. Hubert Herring, History of Latin -^erica f-rsm
cnlng to x res ent , Tiew ork : ..Ifree 7", Knopf,
1^61), p. 762.
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th' ! In ith fcl of V
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b. 1 tendencies anifest;




d. : :ili..n politico o inatod b;; the
ar
"
't of the troops
on >nal loyi 11 .
e. Braiil b«&£tg made safe for C - .coraoy t
rial methode,
bh« b«gir arid *©, the polHio&l
of o ;-ensr; 11j rightist*
12
suthorit: rj attern* olvS La n led ^nr;ent was
I cultural h£' IT of
result of the - :'*- Man of power b; id
support the BllltJ r .
Yar
,
the loader* although desirous of reforr^
ove r ".velv slowly in till Ik
even less of the Bi .ar of beinc "unhorsed.",.
10. lt« t rreedoir. r.nC. . f-foy;- in 1; ti:.; , rlc . , p. 2S .
11. "South /wrr; erica VI: Lrazil," fortune , • une 1939, P. 138.
12. n Lieuwten, * i. i :: ' litlcs in Latin grjUj
.
ff / ' ork : FP ed erf ' i ir f In?., lf>6C), p. 62.
13. I "The Brazil q: /' p. 324.

6This noo< 3 I te, pol' * ct
reforss could h loved In the fi ce Of strong
ining . ::ter
.itieli a - ,
oir which account t, , ..
ri eortunlst, pro»Ffteal»t n4 pro* , til un~
eveiil •: od ) .
trie, I foreign corres . it In 11




light on t' epic's lib' . It is a
dictate i in nanie Only i ople here
'till M f 0,
"l4
Thi it, undoubtedly, It e rather reliable e-
r.ent of tin zilien political 6yste». for th ulatlQR
did not conceive of th Ivee aa beinr Opj by the
x.ever, the c * t the end
of the quotation, People are free onl > ' -e that
hur ity ll considered to be important, there is
person- 1 security within the fr -irk of the state r nd
-
' loll is r ade for each individual to obtain for
himself a proper level of buE! ce consistent with
needs of the state. Clnee freedom in the aforementioned
sense never had b-" tl liliana prior to
thi e, in effect, "ar fj ver."
14. nthor brio, :. --inning Gel
,
{Mo de





7:vertheless, as previously elucidated, Vargas
asirous of movin- "1 toward the Stage at which
freed: e know it, would be a r ty« £»<&
that he never achieved hie- objectives should not be
allowed to obscure his intentions.
fc; W I
i
Brazilian- German relations in the thirti ere
extremely amicable, prims- rilv a i the result of the
German -"rive to exert influence in the ,ern Html sphere
and the unwitting acquiesence of Brazil in this
objective.
itler, i.i a vi I m with Oxis of his lieutenants
on the subject of Brazil stated that " .11 create a
new G-: ;; there.... e sh 11 act 1 like
..'llliam the Concueror end g !". Brazil by the B ;th
of arms. Our eeaoons are not visible ones." _ The
Fuhrer was referring to % stion of subversion from
within by the large numbers of G- »a settled
eathern I-razil.
Be * ' e. - close i the German
i i" rants, the G«.a B conducted oC s-ial : ions on
a bilateral basis in a manner ,1. eazil into a
rmanent trade relationship. ' nnifeeted in the
15. Her - 1 uchine, The Voice of east rust ion , (Ilea York:
G. ?. Putnam's one, 1-40), a. 61.
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'..-... Xlj tded to
pro 3 close relation a 11 the .'.
reality in the I forties* prio; /ioie,
,
piet - of control I ly
1 : n .oacuino.tions, ln©d i : idly external
a tfith t ria staking hi it ion rd
to tto lited . -unci






Pan- l& lection of the
deeIre to m In .. In :ioace within the tanisphar* r,ther
than grunrding it from abroad* In aohii lis
objective* the \ actions in the
ribbean, regardless or indent, , cnor
of our : 'ith t Is of ^ 1 3 .
i ..
., 1 m o. ih« : inin rioi n
republics - t ihe :. . hypercritical
ion of terriuor; . orefore, even
though . ions for e 1 _ou b c b^en friendly,
the U, . i v% . :-d with suspicion and v; aeidered the
real :.e, _-. ,, despite i : t in
oil's coaaneroial relations the Unit. .atat i/or her
not lmpoj . tgle customer.
—
.-
. .. in the decade preceding
»;orld War Two -;Gre, 1 or the BCst part, conducted In
friendly at bera, The Good ..-.eirhbor policy, promoted
.... ., td uch to enr-ure the roocyri.ll of the
Brazilians despite the snti-U.S. military chiefs.
Di p1omat i c r elst i ons , from the 8 ev enth Int er-
rican Conference at Montivideo in 1935 until the Rio
... juiloch, 11 e to the . :ner-io?s , "
"or" • -' * :\-\
.
"\ 'V'-C
) , p . 7.
20. "
- \ 2 11 American Front . ( 9 Drfel




conference In , pro;; I " oved to
a point .' I aipant in












it th .. anoe of
1 3 Mens with : . l entina
objected, v. bus :\ olution of
which, not Oftlj pro;,uf.. oaf or- ace objeol 11
21
oated ' i liie aj , "j\ icers,




. When to whlofet
side to ,rt in t'. " oris: ' Ived,
his Influence with v
,
in . to the
w i-.-ive factor in lng full




Neighbor policy were conducted on a _e since
the hulk of the military assistance avided by
21. Hubert Serring i ;'i Ilictory of Latin . ; ;:crlr;s In i






Germany, The one bright t in the relationship was
the 1 l vy . lesion which performed itr function of
Mooting goodwill end increasing th- eff cctiveness of
th' .-Ilian ' vy so well, that the naval officers were
pro-l' . S. on commencement of the war, In direct contrast
22
to the genern Is.
the War interrupted the shipment of arms to
zil, she turned to the U.S. for weapons . The uV.
•
-reed to supply the needs of the Brazilian armed forces,
but due to the necessity of equipping the rapidly expand-
ing rloan armed forces, was unable to do so until U.S.
pons production was in full swing. This issue of
weapons supply was vexations matter which continued to
hamper U.S. military policy in Brazil until resolution of
the problem. For example, the P # S« wanted to provide
forces for the protection of Morthe II in addition
to obtaining base rights for the Ar»y .dr Force end Navy.
otiations ware continually frustrated until U.S. arms
started to move southward under the Lend- Lea ro prorr^m.
In summary, U.S. -Brazilian relations during the
Vargas re-rime, slowly evolved from a formal, distant
relationship to one of extremely close cooperation in all
22. Samuel ElHot Korricon, The rattle of the ..tl.ntlc
r, 1^3- ay i:A 5 , (Vol. 10, Hi st or- of United
.aval Operations in *orld far II, 15 vols.,
Boston: Little Brown and Co., 19*7), pp. 376-378.
i-
13
endQcvours in :' 'on of ti-
ro. Phil , in t
' the
HOC • &i e; r- 1
TK
:tion Frazil and ll ' the thought of
coffee enters the Bind, for the tv/c are al
ins? parable. Fhe I E ion received la one of an
Inordinate dependence -upon I le crop (ronooulture),
\eh In thourht h ' knovrledpesble economists to be a
curse, einc© It inhibits Industrial development.
ver, In Brazil *t e, it wat th3 ' .renje
nendence -upon coffs© that provided the I ip tint for a
1 rtlreulus toward ^cenor;ic divert ifi or; t ion. fhis
oceurre in the I of the deprass I on in the 1930 *•
with concomitant collapse in coffee prises and the
rel of 1. rge numbers of workers to Industry, 'or
Var ruinous policies oi 1dicing coffee pro-
duction and withholding it from the world v.arket, which
enoourered production in competing countries, were
t erri.net ed.
1938, the decision • "o to rely on the world
arket price for coffee production control. At the
?3. Foreign r Ivision, oial I .ions
rice, ' '. Ivereit", '.".' . ..•ray
: , ok for reril
, ( ins-ton, P. F., ' '. C.,
1^64), . I 5.
.'
'





commence. ent of the European v:cr, this ©oliey, In




" cuIt ivat 1 on of r1 or va ri et i 8
24
eked the Buperproduotion,
ile contributing to th<: solution of %\
problem, V- cted I .-: ention to
iculturi 1 diver, ifie '., ion by sufcr. cotton
'.on, and d< - with the
lUB
.
ft r t) rbor, the
for vc le oil*, fibers, rubber I
other tropical/cubtropi roruc s inproraed on
Brazil which embarked on j i to in©]
uction.
Concurrent vrith increased end diversified
>-l cultural production, MM the Industrial expansion,
concentrated primarily in the consumer foods induct ries,
,he stimulation of rnining operations.
.1 of the aforementioned measures contributed to
the deereeelng dependence upon one crop v/hich had been
chsract eristic of tr , -non;* throughout its
anoaic history. In the part, rllance had been placed
on one crop, ed in one area. Thlt induced i boom
24. Lawrence -. BUI, ed., Brazil
.
(Ber iforaia,
University of California Preee, 1947), p. 233.
nr
15
or bust O 1th B It err. erloilc: of
proaperlty followed b; i :icn.
The ' • i fl on i ndus t ri . . 1 p :- oc u at i on
ri cultural tiflc tion, thi contributed
to tho - -i.ve prcrparity rn.Jc;-ed in Brazil on the
r* of iforId .'or Two.
In ftct, in 19*0 1 brazil IN -—erionciv-.-
t.h on enormous amount of conrt- ruction in housing,
3%orlftJ no municipal Improvement' . 'Iwor-th'-
'ling rood*, 95 percent of which wer nuf- oturod in
ill, * Trade in virtually oil t of product-,
incrr in the period 1^3^-19^0.
The econci i finally becoming oriented toward
the direction of balanced growtb when the war, with i'
shocks on the economic life, commenced in 1-39. In any
e, brazil VU in a porition to benefit economic--lly
In the- lonm-run, p rticulorly with tbm '- stance of
the United ctetes.




October 12, in40 # p. 3^2.

Chapter II
L F-.ctc; : Qgf
TBI ROLE' CF I I
Ve.r
-
, , in the period preceding the ifi r, realised
zil would hive to support on or the- other
in tl ' lending conflict. Hov.rever, he delayed the
support Ltment, insofat" as it oolitic -nd
militarily forcible. Furthermore, the possibility of
mi lit.- ition against the Asia I tioally non-
existent. Hitler, end his leaicnn, although not brttle
tested before l n39, were certainly impressive to the
czilians.
Consequently, the decision to a cknowledpre ' te
of belligerency the Axil in Uguet, 1942, -
the result of a multitude of factors, both 1 nd
internal, that influenced the decision.
Primary | amongst these factors, was the role of
the United Btstes. Basically, the United Statai
interested in Frazil in a strategic sense md aa source
of raw materials vital to the -war effort.
Brazil, by virtue of its geographical location,
1,620 miles from the Brazilian "hump" to Africa, pro-
vided the only logical access to the ertern Hemisphere,
if the Axil decided upon an external attack. Moreover,




and Japi nr. e, - e it
ae focal point! ~r inter"
ion.
If the Axil f' ined I foothold in II, the
anc oulo* bo vulnerable, thur interdicting
wove, ont of the 0, . R vy and ctrippin u. . of its
firet line of defence in one of the two yuardi&n oceons.
U. . illtary planners' acknowledged the vulnera-
bility o zil, particularly In view of the in
ure of the Brazilian aj net: , t :/heir
plans on preventing: an Asia r.ove tc '-era
Hemisphere. Plans were formulated to send n
troops to the Brazilian northeart in the event of
emergency.-1. Diplomatic efforts were directed toward
.ininr* drasilian pennisrion for U.£. to
deploy to t LfeB nort'- nt of
razilin and the pura to
material .
In return for the urs of t...
,
end eventual" 1
for the introduction of d. . i inte -•11, v;e
oured to r ry equipment to

















f th« . ,c., l "50), p.
.
18
Althcnagh finally providing %} ^ons
| .' . ircraft, the . . looked . i se at
111 n war cecl---ration, or for that Batter, a
deoli r-tier, of way I ~ Latin Amerlean republic, & inco
weapons and training would have to be led by the
:
'
3 OS. This was the situation in earl;- V'h2 , when
other a and nations had a precedence over Latin
erica in Obtaining suppllefl from the free worldarsenal.
Consequently, the U. . tOrted the unanimous
severance of diplomatic relations at the Rio Conference
.her than a war declaration.
ly thereafter, in k- rch, 3,9*2, the United
States and Brazil negotic. series Of i ©emant r.
odi ed in d ip 1 oma tic not es and bu 8 i to - on'c r a ct c . In
the agreements, in addition to providing for economic
assistance, raa a nev; lend-lease apreerent calling for
delivery of arms to Brazil with a value o JO, 000, 000
which was double the amount previously arranged for in
l:?4l. Concurrently, the ed to deliver 100
medium tanks, more than 200 light tanks, fifty com"
p
aircraft, antiaircraft and antitank runs.
2. Stetson Conn and Byron E irchild, B - ..:-.. or.
He hejj Defense
.
(Vol. 1, rn i sphere, 3 voir.,
xited - Army in tforld o, in process,
Lhgton, B.C., Offlc the Chief of Bilitary
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the Dr^zili
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nu.-orour pi; -nor and severvl i : ons of
t o
the lie. tt . 9rt<N id
.
[4U tra3 n
in the T , . " bhft& • t
Bnt hioh
ertWbat inatru ' u*
of
ar^in . 1
or oil V4P9, for - t, obsolete,
of Lb out 100,000 I cient in labarm
unprepared to re In fere.
5. illot Morrison, ~v r 1 I
(Vol, 15, History of Unit* ions
in World 'Var II, 1" n: IA1 id
CO , 1962), p. 115,
6. e. o, I; lacs , , p, 5.































In thort , . . ic
•ff in behalf of fetal he
"
--tion of tho tdOnoniQ 're
with L3 the c^hl svr 5«,
rfielwt in
war detlaration it. tic, ir. faet, I oven
If Germany had not Mfei aign of rlne

22
warfare- . - inst Brazil In the months foi: g the
break in rir.lometic r - l . ionr, 7;; have
of bell' conrc: uence
of t, v ctorr .
The ::!:- thro' t in Brazil .. in the thirties,
aIf©8tad internally in economic tion of the
count rv,
problem 1- concerning Axle taploz) . In
! it ion, the problem of th 11 used
concern, ncrtlcularly • fter the intcrr list effort to
plant Vargas* Pic.
,
~ emonst rated that he
was entirely competent to maintain e firm rein on the
activities of the pro-Fasalat I rithin ti
country. Therefore, in regard to the threat that
existed in 1942, it consisted primarily of a military
thr hich became lity in mid 1942.
German plans never directly envisioned a specific
attack on the .< eat era Hemisphere via Brazil, However,
lo-ic: 1 -"tension of their projected Gibi r/Afrlea*
plan (Felix) would have placed th mans in control
of Dakar. The U. . cknowledged this threat by planning
for defensive military action, whereas, the Brazilians

23
were not r - - convinced until \
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not the re .if the
people c-j.il b~ i •-. o an emotional pitch over an issue,
tltal accicion for war will have % ' ~ ence
a
of the 1 ority whio ceesity for the
8. :linson, Battle for the K< lere , (Mew
I rfe : She r 1 er. 3cribner ' e :ons, 19^7), p . 95.
9. Ibid,, p. 96.
J
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13. __nc, 7, 1-4^:.
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'.ft of th to
the Couth . Lie to force the I . , . r.ti-- ©•• to
st^recd t' Ives ever er arcs, exert c Irect
influence upon the ee
support of the population,
.., but '^ons
the roal I
wee it to cnr.ure
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Ib ration c: " 1 - sci ' ,
muc ;e into ml
f, : : . tfhi ' II
naturally affect t ..en. However, ' ually
the Internal factors which are, t c st
' >ortant. leislQO i: pfcesibl :hc ext
factors rre ignored, thtta serv: »e the nation
from th ~cts of th .
For example, in the ; 11, th :tr of
the Germ n I '. ne c '.. n col - en.
ne - the -.sclent of ?r \ lien
ships from plying International wet the
hardshi" ich this woul i c enti ilea. Similarly, the
role of the Unit
, as it I the decision,
would have been superfluous, if the razilian government
had Maintained e rigid neutrality poliay, r less of
U.S. fee re end dec ires.
.s point which I em attempting to make is that
although external factors deserve examination, in t
final 3 is, the internal fact ore are decisive in any
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int,
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ff*l ily occur in ' * ons concern! -us
tens. - 11
define i ; ^ In ' Ps
of
' categories; a - lie concept,
no question razll 1 in
peg - jur3 ion-
dlvidual rid state, nati< e,),
for a a c 1940,
,
includes the
affection and reverence for rlotio flag),
%r itloi b, an eriences so nee r.o
develop : clour. , political
in
Order lop there ha| to '. lief in a
1
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1 . , a b;y U li • . . An
example
1. K. I', iivert, ed. f l*pect.:..nt ieopler: :: tioneiier. end





















h Is ! ;>rts
tO . I the '' of
unit j ulact: and
i / e th si lly f " urcl he state,
thi "on
v.ill i 1 alike, j Ml
2
set is t
In 11, t :• cone , to varying
,
Influential in the fli ^i^ion for wai\
Varj * I 03 c« control sOUtttry
throv fc 3 3 ' Of the
Diilit . miction :' • . - . - • .
of the pie for national unit . In the pr Lag period,
re lc lj " re effect upon '
Con: ntly, i lonal ' t M nder-
:;t cr .orid .ar I,
2. A.Fg .. ci, 1-: .Politi?;:, ork: . Ifred A,
opf, 1961), p. >n
.
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3. For ' : tudiec Dtvj , Fh« lean University,
l_.
.__
rjgn > r^.u :;Ook Tor , ..il
,
boa, D.G.,
G. ..-., \"6h) t p. 4C^.
4. "sc 1c 13 '-. iti -
,
, 1939, . 140.
5. "Good elghbore In the ad kftej roro Lpn - ffairs
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6. . . t, " • "' '. o i ?. 1 -in .... -.:. ooo,
(Stanford, Sellfornia, or<5 University pFe ,
- 7 .
7. 10' n II- o orloon l-'ront .,
Doubieday, Doren < -70., 1941), p. 15°.
.
31
lawn the evening of April 2 let. i teas addressed the
1 rid stated that, "the is 8 symbol of
liberty : nd a nation that does not protect it. is
not worthy to live."g The following cay, an announce-
ment was made that r: il had acknowledged a state of
belligerency with Germany and Italy.
The : oove events were an illustration of national-
ism ar: it existed in Brazil, both as e bolle concept
and a* oolal vine, for no endeavour requires the
subordination of individual loyalties aa the total
commitment to a wajp against an overwhelmingly superior
enemy at a time when the future m kill be in some
doubt
.
There Is probably some slight basis in fact for
Aikisan's contention that the nationalism in Latin -.meri ce-
nt hetic, but in /Brazil's case, I believe that the
events surrounding the war declaration had to have some
solid nationalistic basis in order to arrive at a genuine
consensus among the populace. This was provided by the
Vargas regime in the drive for social change which was
reflected by the new Industrie 1 enterprises, urbanization,
public health campaigns and social legislation. This
resulted in support of the urban elite who demonstrated a






high degree of national consciousness, for they had a
stake in the economic life of the country, the labor
segment of the population, for they v/ere the beneficiaries
of the • oci'.l legislation and the military as the
implement ors of the decision.
In retrospect, the nationalism exhibited by Brazil
during the Vargas regime w composite of the categories
previously mentioned, a symbolic concept, an ideology
and i social value. As such, it fusion of the
nationalism as defined by the European experience and a
was
t'-pe that/characteristic of the underdeveloped areas
which is directed toward achieving an I sndence of
foreign markets and sources of manufactured goods.
Vargas was not only an engineer of this impetus
for national unity, but the recipient of its influence in
the formulation of the policy decision under consideration.
: IC CCKSI DERATIONS
One of the foremost considerations in the formu-
lation of United. States policy objectives in Brazil via s
the economic mobilization of the hemisphere in sup-sort of
the war effort. Brazil, as the richest storehouse of
strategic materials in Latin America, occupied a primary
place of importance In our planning. This virtual
necessity to counter the Axis economic penetration and to
:
33
ure the continue5 ! flow of the »ti la i terials to
compensate for the loss of ources of -uppi; in the
Dot ch Indi es .
In order to obtain the strategic :•at r:U Is we
required, sad to stabilize the Brazilian economy,
technici- ns, personnel, machinery, rails, port facilities
and rhips had to be diverted to Brazil. Since this
necessarily involved extremely complicated economic
problems , seven of nine principal advisors to Sumner
9
v/elles at Flo were economic advisors. Full economic
cooperation was pledged at the Rio Conference with the
United Stat yreeing to provide consumer gOttti to the
Brazilians on the basis as our o\m civilians in
return for their supplying the full mnge of strategic
materials
.
To implement these close economic ties, the U.f.
and Brazil jointly agreed to cooperative measures to
incr~ 6 the Industrial development and agricultural
diversification of Brazil. Included, in these measures
were the projects expediting rubber production in the
zon, the financing of the Volta Bedonda steel plant,
health and sanitation measures, end cooperative financial
"Bood Neighbors and the ar," B Bepublic
.







arr its to stabilize zilian economy. In
addition, the united St I orted the Inter- -ican
Coffee ting agreement designed to -orevent
competition and a price decline. of primary
importance to Brazil in liyht of the independence upon
this single crop.
tie relatione if1th the
European Axis partners in January* 1942, Brazil delayed
a war declaration for a considerable period of time,
deceit e the fact that she was engaged in a campaign
against the German submarines. One of the probable
reasons was that Vargas had second thoughts about en
irrevocable commitment which would transfer the tr-
flow directly to the U.S. from Surope. After the war
ended, thii disruption of the normal trade channels and
full reliance on the U.S. might hairs some disastrous
economic repercussions.
However, as the war progressed, the economic
assistance provided by the U.S. wae having an effect and
what was more important, there was the prospect of
continued econc: ssistano* after the war ended.
Politic : :n0 economically, the two countries
were now joined in an alliance. By a declaration of war,
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the thirties, which accounted for their l - cist
proclivities. However, ite the fact that they
' the Axis, R the Mini :nd the
".ef ct -;rico Dutro and £J©ea onteiro,
respectively, were decorated by Hitler), this didn't
11prevent th« rom being pro- '.linn.
In pursuit of s pro- li- n policy, they engaged,
in a fence-sitting exercise, oonanitting themselves to
neither ei< lag t3 me policy which
war bolized by sending one s on to school in the U.S.
and the other to ( ' _ .
19 aliitarj ler. in he i to a coram it -
t , were pri ona rf1y cons i d. erin« the 23Hit a ry sitU a t i on
which ] rl; 1942 was not ver - ] le for active
Brazil! : rti citation in the I . The bjlesiely
reluctant to end up on the losing side. A secondary
consider t ion was the effect that a pro-U.£. co: at
would have on Argentina and Uruguay. ntina's polie
was one of opposition to the . . (pro* cist), which
could have created a disturbance on Br«tzil*8 southern
border.
As the war progressed and the mllltar tion
11. Hubert Herring, A History of I; tin ..r, erica From
^efrinninp. 1 ?r es ent
.
(New Tor&i Alfred IT, Knopf,
1?S1), r>V» 763-764.




be favorable, with the outcome lr hie,
the mi 13 -hi ft eel to a p of full support
of r declaration. --ides the positive influence of
I f I -or. ble military situation, the 13 .]. the people
woule war de air ion.
en ad it, if Brazil b< ctive
rtioipantj sis aid r< in t
of prestige ". I t. in the lotions as a
member of the winning side. ore. %] 1 nt
Ad ' ese fr ' " LI li
position of being the number one power in Latin imeriea,
thereb" replacing otina, her traditional rival.
Cn this Is, the military leaders a&vooat iroct
ticipation in the war. V In
response to the will of the people : ' ' by the
anomic der.onstr tions .. but primaril ""' to the influence
of the military leaders who had now Joined, i with
other pro-';. . supporters such as the Minister of Foreign
,
ldo ..ranha, decided on war.
The influence of the military, not only in this
decision, but in all decisions of the Vargas F * e, con-
not be under bed for there were no other organised,
of it Ion interest groups in Brazilian societ .
•
33
;or was rigidly controlled, the "burc-ncr-
pOeed of s • landed oli£-
supported hiffl and the ma ined largely inarticulate,
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t 22, 1 ; ed
Latin merit an 3
'
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of tb l- slat 3 e in power, the rnal
politic. 1 tlon with
lev 3 I (M . .
lea a err- "'is), the trend of external event a s&d the
listic trend exemplified by the rei etion of the
Brazilianc to the wasp dee' ion.
Lot* in 1940, Ambassador Oaffery negotiated
cone '° (arn-;", nrvy ana a), fr-or ( pa
in the north to Santa (Jrua in the south. ThS aid heve




diplomatic success, that Brazil w dug to line up on
the side of the Allies, if the decision had to be made.
But even to December 7, 1941, Ver bill undecided,
still uticus 3 1 reft me
co27imitted.- B the Fdo conference in January 1942.
V; r still dubious about taking the final step, but
ented in the co ent to support, the . Hies. Ad
events prO( onthr after Rio, it fin- 11
reached the point where the probJ >f whether or not to
declare wi r Tcould only be resolved in the affirmative. The
recognition of a state of belligerenc: most i ct
replay of the event f as experienced bj zil in orId
r- 1. Then, the war had been in its fourth year when
- zil .joined on October 26, 1" : 17. The Unite'. had
entered the war approximate] aths e i the
provocation was U-boat sinkings, fective contri-
butions consisted primarily of food supplies no a small
novel force to patrol the Atlantic coast.
In 194-2* the in its third ear, the United
altered eight plier and the provocation
war. the same, nineteen chips sunk by submarines,
s only divergence between the tv.ro peri or
that in 1917, Congress declared w&r whereas in 19^2, v
1. Hubert, Herring, A History of Lot in ^i; erica ?rom
-in-iin? to Presont
,
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rounded up Is nationals, strengthened air/na^l patrols
and provided. . .ited States Ferr
rther^ore, he had ordered ry
Inst th« oe.
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of 1/ leade- Ion,
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Infantry divisions, one i—ured division, eleven
tic-ircreft ree-lroents and eleven a©aat ertille'
one
.
ends t Ion w ae
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e plan for the B, .}'". envisioned th llian
.'orces would serve i i
,
bub under the
strategic direction of the United 1
the end of 19*3 and earl;- 19*4, the Hied
offensives were gaining in or: entum. The threat to South
America had been eliminated and the U. . tfae obtr.inir
11 the 8ti - .oris Is it could use. Therefore,
we were content to stand on the Rio agreement e :,;hich did
12
not include overseas action by the lliaaa.
evertheless
,
the Brazilian troops been
training since ugust, 19^3 and v.-ere about re to move
ove: . The final decision to commit the troops to
combat prob: blv influenced by the Britieh viev,' of
the „ . F. expressed by .Inst on Churchill. Churchill
firmly in support of the B,E*F« and said:
"I or: ell for getting the Brazilian
division into Italy as soon as possible.
ffcrt should be made subject to
battle exigencies, to bring this division
into Italy. There should be no talk of a
token force. The above also applies to
the sir s" usdron.".,..
In July, 1144, the B. F.F. arrived in It :r
for action, Fh Igned to General Clark's Fifth
ilaced in the line long the Tyrrhenian coastal
area BO as to hold the left flank on the drive north.
12. John C. ff oi' Council
on For- " Lorifl, The United in orld
s Jn45-1'47 . ork: Harper and Brothers
,
1^47), p. 208.
13. inston "' . Churchill, "losing the Ring: The Ce-ccnd
.crld .:r
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